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Abstract
The aim of this article was to provide an understanding of the reasons for the 
non payment of mortgage bonds in the South African context. The article starts 
off with a brief history on housing finance under apartheid from 1948 to 1994. 
It then conceptualise current housing finance to the lower end of the market 
(mainly for black people) in South Africa. This is followed by a literature review 
of possible reasons that contribute to the non payment of mortgage bonds in 
the South African context and a brief overview of the methodology followed 
during the interviews with defaulters. In the fourth part of the paper, the results 
from the empirical survey are discussed. The results of the survey confirm previous 
research that financial reasons are a fundamental factor that influences the 
non payment of mortgage bonds. According to the respondents, other factors 
that influence non payment include educational problems, political interfer 
ence and peer pressure, and the reaction and efficiency of the banks. The 
recommendations of respondents on solving the problem of non payment in 
clude shorter loan periods, improvement of bank management, and mortgage 
bond education. Reward programmes are also mentioned as a possible 
solution to defaulting. The study concludes that long term affordability is one 
of the main reasons that contribute towards the non payment of mortgage 
bonds. An additional conclusion is that financial institutions need to rethink 
their management of mortgage loans to lower income households.
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Die doel met hierdie artikel is om die redes vir die nie betaling van verbande 
in die Suid Afrikaanse konteks te verduidelik. Die artikel begin met ’n kort ge 
skiedenis, vanaf 1948 tot 1994, wat handel oor behuisingsfinansiering onder 
apartheid. Dit konseptualiseer dan die huidige behuisingsfinansiering aan die 
onderkant van die Suid Afrikaanse mark (vir hoofsaaklik swart mense). Dit word 
gevolg deur ’n literatuuroorsig oor moontlike redes wat tot die nie betaling van 
verbande in die Suid Afrikaanse konteks bydra en ’n kort oorsig oor die meto 
dologie wat in die onderhoude met wanbetalers gebruik is. Die resultate van 
die empiriese opname word in die vierde deel van die artikel bespreek. Dit be 
vestig vorige navorsing, wat getoon het dat finansiële redes ’n grondliggende 
faktor is wat die nie betaling van verbande beïnvloed. Ander faktore wat volgens 
die respondente nie betaling beïnvloed, is opvoedkundige probleme, politieke 
inmenging en groepsdruk en die banke se reaksie en effektiwiteit. Respon 
dente se aanbevelings om die probleem van nie betaling op te los, sluit in 
korter leningstydperke, die verbetering van bankbestuur en opvoeding oor 
verbande. Beloningsprogramme is ook as ’n moontlike oplossing vir wanbeta 
ling genoem. Die studie kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat langtermyn bekostig 
baarheid een van die hoofredes is wat tot die nie betaling van verbande 
bydra. ’n Verdere gevolgtrekking is dat finansiële instellings weer moet herbesin 
oor hoe hulle verbande aan huishoudings in die laer inkomstegroepe bestuur. 
Sleutelwoorde: Huislenings, nie betaling, finansiële instellings, Suid-Afrika
1. Introduction
Housing delivery to the poor is a key element in the South Africandevelopment framework. Soon after the first democratic elec-tions, the South African Government embarked on a pro-
poor housing policy, in terms of which the private sector has to play
an important role (Republic of South Africa. Department of Housing,
1994; Tomlinson, 1998). One of the focal areas of this role is that of
private-sector housing finance. The South African White Paper on
Housing stresses the importance of private-sector housing finance
in the following terms: “Unlocking housing credit is therefore seen as
a fundamental requirement in order to facilitate the ongoing im-
provement of the housing circumstances of such households”
(Republic of South Africa. Department of Housing, 1994: 23). The
housing subsidy system in South Africa was also designed to facili-
tate private-sector housing finance, in addition to the public sector
subsidy (Republic of South Africa. Department of Housing,1994).
These same sentiments are also expressed in the Housing Act (Act
107 of 1997) as well as the housing code. The latest policy document
of the government ‘Breaking New Ground’ further emphasises the
need for housing finance and suggests mechanisms to overcome
the down-payment barrier, loss-limit insurance, funding for social
housing, fixed interest rates, new product development, and moni-
toring (Republic of South Africa. Department of Housing, 2005).
Various attempts have been initiated to ensure a larger degree of
private-sector involvement since 1990 and, more specifically, since
1994. The Home Loan Guarantee Fund was established in 1990 to
provide guarantees to short-term insurers in order to reduce the
risk to financial institutions. The Botshabelo Accord was signed in 1995.
Through an agreement, it enforced the positions of various role-
players (and specifically the private sector) in the housing process.
The National Housing Finance Corporation was initiated in the mid-
1990s for the further support of private-sector housing finance. Other
mechanisms that were implemented included the establishment
of Servcon to address the problem of non-payment – mainly through
‘right sizing’ – and the mortgage indemnity fund, which was aimed
at opening up areas for possible private-sector investment. In 2000,
the Home Loan and Mortgage Disclosure Act (no 63) was passed
(though not yet implemented) by Parliament, with the aim of pro-
moting ‘fair lending practices’ requiring financial institutions to pro-
vide information regarding the provision of home loans (Republic
of South Africa, 2000b: 1).
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Despite these efforts to promote private-sector housing finance,
not much progress has been made in the lower end of the housing
market. In fact, Shisaka (2003: 25) points out that “Government has
seen the withdrawal of … major banks from its housing programme
…” In addition, approximately 50 000 household properties have
been reclaimed by the original financers. This boils down to an ex-
posure of banks to a possible loss totalling approximately R2 billion,
as a result of people’s unwillingness or inability to pay for the houses
any longer (Tomlinson, 1997; Porteous & Naicker, 2003). This reality
has major implications for the willingness of financial institutions to
grant mortgage loans in certain areas. Notwithstanding actions by
the South African government, as well as a limited amount of re-
levant research (Tomlinson, 1999b; Porteous & Naicker, 2003), there
still seems to be little understanding of the reasons that contribute
to the non-payment of mortgage bonds. Meanwhile, empirical re-
search in this regard has been limited, and the little that is available
is already more than ten years old (Porteous & Naicker, 2003 with
reference to the study conducted by the Home Loan Guarantee
Fund in 1993). However, in most cases, this research conceptualised
the problem well (Tomlinson, 1999b), although empirical evidence
has not always been available. This article attempts to address this
gap by means of empirical evidence obtained from a study con-
ducted amongst some of the mortgage bond defaulters themselves.
Against this background, the aim of the paper is to provide an un-
derstanding of the reasons for non-payment of mortgage bonds
in the South African context, on the grounds of an empirical investi-
gation conducted amongst a group of home-owners who are either
unwilling or unable to continue to pay their mortgages.  The paper
will take the matter even further by debating the implications of the
results within the South African context. In fact, in this regard we
would like to put forward two main arguments. Firstly, considering the
fact that the research confirms previous research results, which led
to the conclusion that financial inability and the inappropriateness of
the mortgage lending instruments are the main contributing reasons
for non-payment, the question is whether further pressure on the
private sector is appropriate. Most of the current ‘politically correct’
arguments suggest that the private sector should be more inno-
vative. We would like to argue that, although it is probably true that
there is room for more innovation, extending housing finance to
people who cannot afford it will not solve the problem. Secondly,
the results of our research suggest that financial institutions could
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benefit from improved client relationships and management prac-
tices – an aspect that has been mentioned in other research too
(Tomlinson, 1997; Porteous & Naicker, 2003), but which, in our
opinion, has been underplayed. In order to argue these two points,
the paper is structured as follows: It starts off with a brief history of
housing finance under apartheid. An attempt is then made to
conceptualise housing finance to the lower end of the market
(mainly comprising black people) in South Africa, after which a
literature review is provided in respect of possible reasons that
may be contributing to non-payment of mortgage bonds in the
South African context. This is followed by a brief overview of the
methodology followed during the interviews with defaulters.  In the
fourth part of the paper, the results from the empirical survey are
discussed. Finally, a number of conclusions are drawn.
2. The South African housing policy and housing
market between 1948 and 1994
This section reflects on housing policy and delivery after the imple-
mentation of apartheid in 1948. It is possible to divide housing delivery
under apartheid into three phases. The first phase, between 1950
and 1976, was characterised by the provision of public-sector rental
housing in almost all of South Africa’s black townships (Wessels,
1989). This large-scale housing delivery in the townships went hand-
in-hand with influx-control mechanisms and mainly comprised a
way to clear up townships (Wessels, 1989; Krige, 1991). The second
phase of housing delivery under apartheid housing is associated
closely with the Soweto riots. The riots forced the apartheid govern-
ment to consider 99-year leasehold and also led to the establishment
of the Urban Foundation, which played an important role in changing
government housing policies (Wessels, 1989). According to Wessels
(1989), the third phase started in the mid-1980s, when it became
possible for black South Africans to access ownership in South African
townships. At the same time, influx control was abolished at the
end of 1985. The government of the day attempted to create a
black middle class (in areas called ‘black spots’), which could
support it in a democratic era (Wessels, 1989). Although the policy
of orderly urbanisation that succeeded influx control still prevented
the poor from gaining access to the cities, the acceptance of own-
ership for black people ensured that a new mortgage-bond market
developed (Parnell, 1991). However, it was not long before the non-
payment of these mortgage bonds was used as a mechanism to
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support the political struggle against apartheid (Tomlinson, 1999b;
Johnson, 1999). Part of the problem was the breakdown of normal
legal processes in townships, as mortgage lenders were unable to
secure possession of bonded properties and avoid the eviction of
defaulting occupants (Porteous & Naicker, 2003: 193).
The apartheid history of housing delivery has probably influenced
the existing housing market in former black townships in two funda-
mental ways. In the first place, normal housing mobility was virtually
non-existent. Its absence was related to the control mechanisms of
the apartheid state with regard to housing delivery and the fact that
a limited housing market existed, as a result of the lack of land
ownership. No culture of housing upgrading through mobility has thus
developed over time. Furthermore, historically, virtually no housing
market existed in black townships; and recent research suggests
that even currently, little activity is under way (Rust, 2004).
Secondly, the fact that housing delivery for black people was
directly linked to housing in the South African black townships is
related to the absence of housing mobility. The ability to be mobile
and to upgrade was virtually absent.
3. The current South African housing market
When the African National Congress (ANC) came into power in 1994,
it inherited a housing market characterised by severe abnormali-
ties, as a result of the policies and political turmoil of the pre-
democratic era (Republic of South Africa. Department of Housing,
2000a). Recognising the housing shortage in South Africa, the ANC
promised to deliver one million houses to the poor within five years
(ANC, 1994). At the same time, the Botshabelo Accord was signed
between government and business to normalise the housing envi-
ronment – in order to ensure a larger degree of private-sector
housing finance as a supplement to public-sector housing finance,
amongst other objectives. The one-million milestone was an import-
ant goal for the housing department of the post-apartheid govern-
ment and was realised in 1999 by means of a targeted subsidy to
the poor (Dimant, 2001; Schlemmer & Smith, 2001; Rust, 2003).2 How-
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2 The subsidy initially provided R15 000 to households in which spouses earned a joint
income of R800; R12 500 to households with incomes of between R801 and R1 500;
R9 500 to households with incomes of between R1 501 and R2 500; and R5 000 to
households with incomes of between R2 501 and R3 500.
   
ever, despite this extraordinary achievement, very little of the housing
delivery linked the private-sector and public-sector finance. The
National Housing Finance Corporation (NHFC) estimates that, by
2000, less than 2% of housing subsidies provided by the state were
credit-linked (NHFC 2000). In some of the latest research commis-
sioned by the National Department of Housing, Shisaka (2003: 26)
notes that the capital subsidy scheme has become increasingly
less useful as a supply side intervention for attracting private-sector
delivery.
According to Pillay (2003), it is possible to divide the current housing
finance market into four segments.3 The first segment entails a sig-
nificant number of households that fall into the category of those
earning less than R1 500 per month. These households, in general, are
unable to access private-sector finance (with the possible excep-
tion of finance from micro-lenders), and are mostly dependent on
public housing finance by means of the subsidy. The second group
comprises households earning between R1 500 and R3 500 per month.
In addition to the state subsidy, low-income households that have
an average household income of between R1 501 and R3 500 have
access to supplementary finance through mortgages, pension/
provident lending, micro-finance and instalment sales (Pillay, 2003;
Porteous & Naicker, 2003). However, although the initial degree of
access to private-sector housing finance was significant after 1994
(approximately 12% of all subsidies were linked to private-sector
housing finance), it had decreased to less than 2% by the early
2000s. Housing-finance institutions began to regard investment in
this market as being too risky and costing to administer. Another
contributing aspect was the fact that the income bands were never
expanded to accommodate inflation.4 A household income of R2
500 in 1994 is equal to an income of at least R5 000 in 2003. How-
ever, in 2003, such a household could not access a housing subsidy,
owing to the fact that the income bands were still the same as in
1994. The third segment consists of households currently receiving
an income of between R3 500 and R7 000 per month.These house-
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3 This division is applicable to the time at which this study was conducted. New
announcements by the Minister of Housing have resulted in some changes in this
regard.
4 Some adjustments have taken place with a media release by the Minster of
Housing in August 2004.
 
holds are mainly dependent on private-sector finance, but such
finance is virtually absent. The fourth segment comprises households
earning above R7 000. Private-sector housing finance is available
for this category. Furthermore, low-income households that are ex-
cluded from accessing housing subsidies include informally em-
ployed people and those who are employed in small businesses
without a payroll deduction facility (Smit, 2003: 174). Although not
exclusively, the non-payment for services has taken place in the
income categories below R7 500 and, in the majority of cases, in
former black townships in South Africa.
4. Possible reasons for defaulting on mortgage-bond
payments in the low-cost housing sector: an
overview
The available literature suggests the following possible reasons for
the non-payment of mortgage bonds:
• financial and economic circumstances;
• the lengthy period linked to mortgage bonds;
• product defects;
• political and community reasons; and
• in-effective housing-education programmes.
In recent times, the possible influence of HIV/AIDS has also been
mentioned as it usually leads to an increase in medical costs for a
household (Tomlinson, 1999b; Porteous & Naicker, 2003). However,
in an analysis that was carried out by the Home Loan Guarantee
Company in 1993 (cf. Porteous & Naicker, 2003: 193), it was found
that political issues were not among the main reasons for defaulting
on mortgage-bond payments. According to the above analysis,
the causes of defaults varied from problems in respect of afforda-
bility (59%) and lack of education (22%), to dissatisfaction with pro-
duct delivery (11%) and, lastly, inappropriate lending mechanisms
(4%) and political factors (4%). Each of these main aspects will now
be examined in more detail.
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4.1 Financial and economic reasons and the lengthy
periods of mortgage bonds
Porteous and Naicker (1993) related the non-payment for services
to an inability to pay in 59% of these cases. Research completed by
the Centre for Development Support in South Africa confirmed the
phenomenon of the inability to pay regarding the cost recovery
related to service delivery (Botes et al. 2001; Mcgee et al. 2003;
Pelser & Botes, 2003; Botes & Pelser, 2004; Pelser & Botes, 2004).
Research conducted in the 1990s (cf. Wilson, 2001: 21-22) shows that
South Africa lost jobs in most sectors between 1993 and 1998 – ex-
cept for the financial services sector. The average annual job losses
were estimated at 5,5% in mining, 4,3% in construction, 2,1% in
transport, 1,4% in utilities, 0,9% in agriculture and 0,6% in manufac-
turing. According to the census data of 2001, the official5 unem-
ployment rate among economically active people (aged between
15 and 65 years) had risen from 33,9% in 1996 to 41,6% in 2001. The
unemployment rate amongst black Africans had increased from
42,5% (1996) to 50,2% (2001). Amongst black African women, unem-
ployment had risen from 52,4% (1996) to 57,8% (2001). Besides re-
trenchment, other factors also influence the financial position of
households and contribute to the non-payment of mortgage bonds.
These factors include high interest rates,6 the inability to manage
household incomes, incidental unexpected events such as illness
or death and HIV/AIDS (Schlemmer & Smith, 2001; Rust, 2002; Tom-
linson, 2002; Quindium Consulting, 2002). Since subsidies for people
in the R1 501 - R3 500 income bracket have to be topped up with
bonds and service payments, some of the beneficiaries in this
income group may ultimately have less money for other essentials
than would have been the case if they did not have housing finance
obligations (Schlemmer & Smith, 2001: 46). Tomlinson (1999a; 1999b)
argued that beneficiaries who fell into this income group were much
9
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5 Official definition of unemployment: Statistics South Africa defines the unemployed
as those in the economically active populations who have not worked during the
last seven days prior to being interviewed, who want to work and are available to
start work within a week of the interview, and have taken active steps to look for
work or provide themselves with self employment in the four weeks preceding the
interview.
6 It should be noted that interest rates are currently (early 2005) at some of their
lowest levels in history in South Africa.
      
more likely to complain that their circumstances had worsened after
receiving the subsidy and mortgage bond than were beneficiaries
who had received the full subsidy. Many low-income borrowers are
highly vulnerable when their financial circumstances worsen. When
experiencing economic hardships, they are generally unable to pro-
tect themselves against the consequences of missing their monthly
instalments (Tomlinson, 1999b). Other beneficiaries default because
they misunderstand budget constraints or lack financial discipline.
Poor households like these are inclined to over-borrow when their
economic circumstances deteriorate (Rust, 2002; Tomlinson,
2002).
4.2 Product defects regarding low-cost housing
Dissatisfaction with housing products is often a main reason for the
decision by a low-income household to stop paying its mortgage
or loan (Marais, 1997). One of many problems that have plagued
housing delivery is the poor quality of houses (Zack & Charlton, 2003).
In numerous cases, consumers’ complaints have been valid. Many
houses lacked proper foundations and developed cracks and leaks
within a few weeks after erection (Tomlinson, 1999a; Cohen, 2000;
Schlemmer & Smith, 2001). The unreasonableness of expecting
people to pay for poor housing has also been noted (Johnson, 1999;
Schlemmer & Smith, 2001; Tomlinson, 1997). Although Johnson (1999)
as well as Pelser and Botes (2002) focused only on the issue of pay-
ment for municipal services, they are of the opinion that a definite
correlation exists between levels of services in a community and
payment (or willingness to pay) for such services. It is often argued
that poor service delivery has resulted in a decision by beneficiaries
to withhold payment for services delivered (Mcdonald & Pane,
2003; Mcgee et al, 2003, Pelser & Botes, 2003; Johnson, 1999). This
was indeed found to be the case in the Soweto survey of 2003 (see
Pelser & Botes, 2003). However, the outcomes of both the Wave 1
and Wave 2 surveys in the Mpumalanga province suggested no
relationship between people’s satisfaction with service delivery and
their actual payment behaviour – in other words, people do not
necessarily pay less frequently because they are unhappy with the
level or quality of service provision (Botes & Pelser, 2004).
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4.3 Lack of understanding and/or information
Many low-income home-owners do not fully understand the regula-
tions applicable to housing, or do not realise the consequences of
non-payment, nor do they seek appropriate advice in the event
of hardship or a crisis (Rust, 2002). Many owners have a limited
understanding of the difference between structural problems and
cosmetic faults. First-time, low-cost home-owners often do not
understand that the quality of the product is the developer’s res-
ponsibility and not that of the bondholder. When owners stop re-
paying loans as a result of structural defects, this is indicative of an
inadequate understanding of loan conditions. Some beneficiaries
assume that, when an assessor inspects a new house, he or she is
certifying its quality. They do not understand that the bank is simply
verifying whether the value of the house is equal to or higher than
the value of the bond (Tomlinson, 1999b; Rust, 2002). Although the
NHBRC have started to guarantee the quality of houses constructed
under the project subsidies, it might still be a problem for years to
come.
Many borrowers do not fully comprehend the nature or extent of
their financial commitments because of limited education, inex-
perience and, often, inadequate information provided by financial
institutions (Tomlinson, 1999b). Beneficiaries may misunderstand
their repayment responsibilities because of the perception that
the bank owns the property until it is paid off (Rust, 2002: 23). Some
home-owners maintain that the banks constantly refuse to talk to
them about reasons for non-payment, or to allow them to negotiate
alternative instalment amounts for repayment that are more reason-
able (Schlemmer & Smith, 2001: 46). Advice tends to be available
on demand only.
4.4 Cultural and political factors
The origins of non-payment in the housing sector are rooted in the
fact that the state played a limited role in low-cost housing de-
livery in the apartheid era. The apartheid regime used housing
delivery as a means to segregate the different population groups.
As a majority group, black Africans reacted with widespread resist-
ance to the apartheid government through the boycotting of rent,
as well as refusal to pay the fees charged for services and to make
mortgage payments (Kroukamp, 1995; Parker, 1995; Sono, 1995). At
the time, community civic leaders would organise collective action
11
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to prevent evictions from taking place. When an eviction did occur,
communities would make sure that the houses were occupied again
as soon as possible. This resistance was supported by liberation
movements in an attempt to break down a government that had
no legitimacy for the majority (Jenkins & Smith, 2001; Tomlinson,
2002). It was expected that the culture of non-payment would de-
cline after the political transition to a democracy. However, this
did not occur – some people in the low-cost housing sector not only
refuse to pay mortgage bonds or loans, but also resist being evicted.
This culture of non-payment undermines the authority of the state and
its capacity to deliver (Khan & Ambert, 2003: xxviii). It also increase
risk of lending and banks to withdraw from this market segment.
4.5 Impact of HIV/AIDS
Rust (2003) is of the opinion that the low-cost housing-finance sector
is unresponsive to important factors such as the impact of HIV/AIDS
(Rust, 2003: 21). Given the progressive and life-limiting nature of
HIV/AIDS, mortality rates among certain sectors of the South African
population are likely to increase substantially over the next few years.
It is estimated that more than a quarter of the economically active
South African population will be infected with HIV by 2006. In de-
veloping countries, the AIDS epidemic lags behind the HIV epidemic
by some eight to ten years – the length of time the condition takes
to give rise to serious illness and death. From this perspective, South
Africa is, only now, slowly entering a period of substantial and in-
creasing deaths and disabilities – a situation which, according to
projections, will peak between 2010 and 2015.
Arguably, the most severe impact of HIV/AIDS occurs at the house-
hold level. The broader macro-economic impacts of HIV/AIDS all
originate at the household and individual level, which is where the
real impact of the epidemic is felt. The household experiences a loss
in income, owing to frequent absenteeism of the infected member
from work, while household expenditure for medical expenses in-
creases substantially. It is broadly assumed that few mortgage bene-
ficiaries in the low-income sector will have access to sophisticated
anti-retroviral medication and health management. Many HIV-
positive individuals will only become aware of their HIV status when
they fall ill, if at all. The death of the sick person results in permanent
loss of income and, at the same time, an increase in household ex-
penditure as a direct result of funeral and mourning costs. Taking
12
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this into consideration, the mortgage lender is exposed to an es-
calating incidence of payment defaulting. The stigma associated
with HIV/AIDS, along with the tendency towards non-disclosure among
infected people, has serious consequences in respect of the non-
payment of mortgage bonds (Quindiem Consulting, 2002: 9, 13, 37).
5. Non-payment of mortgage bonds: Some empirical
evidence
In the remaining part of this paper, the emphasis shifts to the results
of the empirical investigation conducted for this study.
5.1 Methodological overview
In order to facilitate an investigation of the responses of mortgage
defaulters, 100 telephone interviews were conducted with randomly
selected current defaulters in respect of mortgage loans in the
Gauteng province during the second semester of 2003. The majority
of these interviewees resided in former black townships. Specific
areas were Boksburg (27), Vereeniging (18), Germiston (12), Tokoza
(11), Krugersdorp (6), Pretoria (4), Kempton Park (3) and Benoni (3).
The focus of the questionnaire was on determining the reason for
non-payment for services, as well as on trying to find possible solu-
tions. The average registered bond amount at the time of the inves-
tigation was R41 532. According to Servcon, the average age of
these registered bonds is approximately 10 years. The initial dates
on which the bonds were taken out vary from 1988 to 1996. The
gender distribution of respondents was 51% female and 49% male.
In terms of the age breakdown, 3% were between 18 and 29 years
old, 21% between 30 and 39 years, 45% between 40 and 49 years
and 31% were older than 50. At the same time, however, almost a
quarter of the households generated a total monthly income of
more than R5 000. Of these, more than 10% fell into the income
category of more than R7 000 per month.  It should be noted that
accessing the 100 respondents was no easy task. Ultimately, more
than 150 respondents had to be contacted, as most people were
fairly suspicious when the purpose of the phone call was explained
to them.
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5.2 The reactions of respondents and contributing
reasons for non-payment
5.2.1 Financial reasons
As indicated in the literature overview, financial considerations were
one of the main contributing reasons for the non-payment of mort-
gage bonds. In an open question, respondents were requested to
indicate what they considered to be the main reason for not
paying their mortgage bonds (see Table 1 below).





Became unemployed 45 34 8




Spouse became ill 14 10.9
Cannot afford monthly
instalment 9 7.0
Other 23 17 8
Total 129 100.0
It is noteworthy that all the reasons given for non-payment are, to
some extent, related to either a direct change in the financial si-
tuation of a defaulting household or, indirectly, to someone in the
household falling ill. The main reason (mentioned by more than one
third of the interviewees) related to unemployment. If the instances
in which the spouse became unemployed are added, this means
that 48% of the respondents cited unemployment as playing an
important role. This correlates well with the results of a different
question in response to which 46.8% of the respondents said that
their mortgage bonds had become too expensive. As already noted
in the literature overview, the increasing unemployment undoubtedly
plays a role. In this regard, it should also be mentioned that, under
apartheid rule, the South African economy had been fairly pro-
tected. The opening of the economy in the early 1990s and the
impact of globalisation have probably contributed to the levels of
unemployment.
A second aspect related to the financial situation is the fact that
16.3% of the respondents claimed that they could not pay their mort-
gage bonds any longer, as they were obliged to use the money
to pay for other expenses, while 7% indicated that they could not
afford to continue paying their monthly instalment. A factor that
has probably contributed extensively to this state of affairs is the
fluctuation of interest rates in South Africa. At one stage, during
the latter part of 1990, interest rates peaked at more than 20%.  These
fluctuations surely do have a major impact on household finances.
A third factor with major implications for long-term housing finance
relates to the possible impact of HIV/AIDS. It is noteworthy that 17
respondents (13.2%) related their non-payment to the illness of a
spouse. Although it is not possible to relate this directly to the impact
of HIV/AIDS, it is probable that this factor does, in fact, play a cru-
cial role in this regard. It is also noteworthy that the study conducted
by Porteous and Naicker in 1993 did not in any way relate the non-
payment of mortgage bonds to home-owners becoming ill.
The significant effect of poor financial means is further reflected in
the fact that four out of every ten respondents indicated that they
had been obliged to cut back on other expenses. The most promi-
nent expenses entailed food, school fees and clothing. The problem
of limited financial means was further assessed by asking res-
pondents how they would spend an extra R500, if they had it. This
strategy was aimed at achieving some understanding as to whether
the respondents’ alleged problem of limited finances was genuine
or not. Thirty percent of the respondents indicated that they would
spend the money on paying school fees; 21% responded that they
would buy food; 15% would buy clothing; and 6.1% would pay for
municipal services. Overall, these figures confirm the importance
of the lack of financial means as a contributing reason for the non-
payment of mortgage bonds.
The above results clearly seem to support the conclusions in the li-
terature about the inappropriateness of the conventional mortgage
lending instrument. They also indicate that there is probably room
for more innovative lending instruments.
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The survey also covered the respondents’ reactions when asked
to indicate whether they had a clear understanding of how their
bond repayments worked. Sixty-five percent of the respondents
indicated that the bond loan had been explained to them when
they took up the bond. In contrast, an alarming proportion of res-
pondents – 23% and 9% respectively – reported that the bond loan
had never been explained to them, or that they were uncertain
as to whether the conditions for repaying the bond had been
explained to them. In the context of taking up a mortgage bond,
a lack of proper education probably does not comprise a funda-
mental contributing reason for non-payment for services. However,
the results probably indicate that a far better educational process
is required when a mortgage bond is approved. In fact, 3% of the
respondents indicated that, even though they had received instruc-
tion, they did not understand the consequences in the case of non-
payment.
5.2.3 Political interference and peer pressure
The virtual absence of political reasons for non-payment of mortgage
bonds reflected by this survey is interesting. This is in contrast to the
results of the research by Porteous and Naicker (2003). Although
political motivations were probably more prominent in the mid-
1980s and early 1990s, very little evidence of such motivations was
found in this survey. However, in response to a specific question as
to whether anybody had ever tried to persuade the respondent
not to pay off his/her bond, 12% answered in the affirmative. This
figure was lower than the percentage of respondents who indicated
that they had been urged not to pay for municipal services. Issues
relating to peer pressure seem to be more relevant. Approximately
19% of the respondents mentioned that they would consider discon-
tinuing the payments on their bonds if they knew they would get
away with it. A further 21% of the respondents indicated that they
would stop paying their mortgage bonds if other people were not
paying. These results also have major implications for the way in
which banks operate, as well as for the normal legal process.  What
seems to be clear is that banks should not leave defaulters under
the impression that they (the banks) are not serious about recovering
their loans.
     
5.2.4 Reaction and efficiency of the bank
The efficiency of the bank should be considered at two levels. In
the first place, one should consider the normal communication of
banks with their clients and, secondly, the reaction of banks after
the failure to pay the first instalment. The ways in which the banks
manage their accounts and the problems that arise at the onset
of non-payment, seem to be an essential consideration. Although
it is not always possible to compare survey results with the actual
actions of banks, only 54% of the respondents indicated that they
had received monthly statements on their bond accounts. A further
18% indicated that they had only received such statements once
in six months, 9% had received statements once a year, whilst 17%
indicated that they had never received such statements. A further
2% were uncertain. In addition, approximately one out of every five
respondents said that they did not understand the statements that
they had received. These figures reflect the limited realisation of
financial institutions in respect of the need to manage their housing
finance in these areas in more detail and more regularly. In addition
to this problem, a further 21% of respondents mentioned that they
had a limited understanding of the financial statements sent to
them regarding their mortgage bonds.
The second issue relates to the bank’s response after the failure to
pay the first instalment. Although this aspect is, once again, being
considered from the point of view of the client, a number of interesting
aspects should be mentioned. Firstly, only 52% of the respondents
reported that they had been contacted by the bank within the
first month. Interestingly enough, 34% had received a letter and
18% of the respondents had been contacted telephonically. The
fact that such a low percentage of respondents had been
contacted by phone indicates that this is an aspect on which
banks could certainly improve. Furthermore, only 6% of the
respondents mentioned that a bank official had made a private
appointment with them. An alarming 22% of the respondents said
that they had received no reaction from the bank. In contrast,
84% of the respondents said that they had visited the bank to
explain their situation. When asked what the bank should do in
similar cases, 42% of the respondents suggested that the bank
should sit down and discuss the problem with the client –
something that has not happened in practice, according to
respondents. What is clear is that banks need more strict credit
control and prompt reaction.
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The above results suggest that the banking sector will have to ma-
nage bonds for lower-income people with a far more ‘hands-on’
approach than seems to be the case at present.
5.2.5 Actions of the defaulters
Having considered the issue surrounding the reaction of the financial
institutions, the focus shifts to the action taken by the respondents
after defaulting. Respondents mentioned several steps that they had
taken to pay their arrears. The largest proportion of respondents
(38.1%) indicated that they had arranged for a fixed monthly instal-
ment. Attempts to borrow money from elsewhere (friends, family,
other financial institutions and micro-lenders) were reported by
16.8% of respondents while 24.8% indicated that they had taken
no remedial steps. In addition, respondents were asked whether
they had cut back on other expenses to pay their arrears. Almost
four out of ten respondents indicated that this was indeed the case.
5.3 Suggestions to solve the problems 
Respondents were also invited to suggest alternatives and make
recommendations. From the results, it seems that a range of pos-
sible actions could be undertaken to address the problem of non-
payment. Tomlinson (1999b) has already suggested that alternative
financing methods should be considered. Special consideration
should be given to financing models that cover shorter periods. Our
research supports this proposal on two grounds. Firstly, the reasons
for non-payment suggest that the 20-year period of a bond leaves
many households vulnerable should they lose their regular income.
Secondly, the fluctuating interest rates also make it difficult to keep
the repayments low. It should be mentioned that some progress
has been made in this regard and that a number of alternative
products have been developed lately. Although they might offer
different forms of security and although their repayment levels might
entail shorter periods, the monthly instalments are not necessarily
lower.
Although long-term income is a prerequisite for mortgage bond
payments, the results of the survey also suggest that bank manage-
ment in respect of default and mortgage-bond education should
be improved and intensified. This was confirmed in the answers of
respondents to a question on what banks should do to ensure mort-
gage bond payments (see Table 2).
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Table 2: Respondents’ suggestions for increased mortgage
bond payments 
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Suggested actions N %
1. Explain constantly why it is important to pay off the
bond loan in time 51 29.5
2. Lower the monthly instalment 38 22.0
3. Keep regular contact by means of letters 32 18.5
4. Ensure that the applicant can afford the loan 18 10.4
5. Other suggestions 12 6.9
6. Uncertain 10 5.8
7. Implement an incentive/loyalty programme 8 4.6
8. Impose heavy penalties for late/non payment 4 2.3
Total 173 100.0
The most prominent suggestion relates to continued education and
awareness with regard to payment. Approximately 48% of the res-
pondents expressed a desire for this. These respondents either asked
for constant awareness in respect of payments, or requested regular
contact by means of letters.
At the same time, 22% of the respondents mentioned that consi-
deration should be given to lowering the monthly instalment.  How-
ever, interest rates usually impact on instalment amounts and are
extremely difficult to manipulate – except by extending the payment
period. However, this is also not preferable.
Reward programmes were also mentioned by 8% of the respond-
ents as a possible method of improving mortgage bond payments.
The current reward systems in the South African environment are
fairly common. In general, individualised rewards were considered
more acceptable than community-based rewards. For example,
87% of the respondents favoured a “lucky-draw” system and nearly
83% were in favour of receiving bonus points that could be used
for purchasing household goods. Seventy-eight percent said that
regular and consistent payment should be rewarded with lower
interest rates. However, just over 50% of the respondents felt that
communities with a good record of payment should be rewarded
by benefiting from development projects.
Another suggestion that was put forward by 24% of respondents
was that banks should make absolutely sure that applicants can
   
afford mortgage bonds before approving such bonds. This is, to a
certain degree, in conflict with current government pressure to
enhance private-sector finance to the lower end of the market.
Nearly 46% of the respondents mentioned that, if they were the
bank, they would immediately discuss the problem with the specific
client – something which had not happened in their experience.
Another area of management that could be improved is that of
payment methods. Approximately 69% of the respondents indicated
that their method of payment was by means of cash. A further
26% and 4%, respectively, mentioned that their payments were
deducted from their salaries or their bank accounts.When asked
which method of payment they would prefer, 32% mentioned sa-
lary deductions, while 22% opted for deductions from their bank
account. Only 45% expressed a preference for cash payments.
These results are a clear indication that, at the level of payment
methods alone, banks could reduce their risks to a considerable
degree.
6. Recommendation
The results of the survey have confirmed previous research results,
which indicate that long-term affordability (or the lack thereof)
due to poor health or unemployment is one of the main causative
factors contributing towards the non-payment of mortgage bonds.
In fact, a fairly large proportion of respondents suggested that banks
should make sure that prospective clients can afford the services.
On the other hand, government is placing increased pressure on
the private financial sector to increase the financial services in the
market. Although there is always room for the development of inno-
vative lending instruments, a simple increase in mortgage loans to
poorer areas will not solve the problem. In fact, it could lead to an
increase in non-payment, which in turn could result in an increased
need for risk management on the part of the bondholder.
The second main conclusion on the basis of this study is that finan-
cial institutions need to rethink their management of mortgage loans
to lower-income households. Banks may consider payment mecha-
nisms that differ from current practices, as well as a more direct
approach in the event of non-payment. In addition, a continued
process of education will be required. Although previous research
has alluded to these issues, the current research has highlighted
them as mainstream arguments that need careful consideration.
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In the light of the main findings, the research suggests that govern-
ment should be far more careful in respect of trying to force finan-
cial institutions to provide housing finance to those who cannot 
afford it. Secondly, banking institutions should change their 
current management processes in the lower end of the market. A 
far more direct and ‘hands-on’ approach than the current process is 
required. This should be enhanced by continuous contact and 
education of the client. Other key recommendations include 
ensuring that life insurance is made available to beneficiaries 
without increasing the payment rate significantly.
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